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Study of Intelligence Production  
on Yugoslavia

Purpose:

To determine, by historical comparison, how well the intelligence community is maintaining professional standards and quality of intelligence production on Yugoslavia; and on the basis of lessons learned, to prepare conclusions and recommendations regarding intelligence processes and products.

The Approach:

In the case of Yugoslavia we do not have a major event or crisis in recent years which provides a yardstick against which to measure our intelligence estimates. The biggest question -- what happens after Tito? -- remains a question for the future.

This study, therefore, would use a descriptive approach to an assessment of the nature and extent of the production effort, leading to conclusions as to whether the level of effort is appropriate and whether the community is applying enough of the right kinds of resources to the production problem. Questions to be addressed would include the following:

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1. Why is the U.S. interested in Yugoslavia? Is the U.S. interest increasing or declining? What were the main intelligence questions we were trying to answer five years ago?
2. What has been the production effort on Yugoslavia during the last five years? What is the comparison between the past year and five years ago with regard to: number of people engaged in production; kinds of specialists (political, economic, military, etc.); qualifications (education, experience, language, travel to the area); trends in professional caliber of analysts working on Yugoslavia?
3. What has been produced during the past year as compared with five years ago? What were the subjects covered? The volume? What is the quality of recent production as compared with five years ago? Is the quality improving, holding up, or declining?

Study Procedure:

A study group, which State would be prepared to chair, would be made up of representatives of CIA, DIA, and INR. For assessing the quality of products, the group should have the assistance of a panel which might include, for example, one or two Foreign Service Officers and one or two outside area specialists on Yugoslavia.

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